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Abstract 
This paper compares the capacity to smooth the impact of asymmetric shocks in the US and in 
the euro area (EA) and examines the various mechanisms through which the shock absorption 
occurs. It first notes that comparable data for the US and the EA are not readily available, and 
that in the US, state accounting is such that what the literature commonly calls international 
risk-sharing in reality embeds inter-temporal consumption-smoothing through retained 
corporate earnings. With this in mind, we build euro area aggregates suitable for comparison. 
Our findings confirm that international capital markets in the US are a more powerful tool for 
risk-sharing than in the EA, but less so than previously reported. The better performance of the 
US is explained by very poor shock-absorption dynamics in the peripheral euro area countries, 
especially after 2010, as well as by a higher persistence of shocks in the euro area relative to 
the US. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, and in particular after the sovereign debt crisis, the idea of international risk-
sharing as a tool to increase the resilience of the monetary union to asymmetric shocks has 
become part of the debate on the reform of E(M)U governance.   
International risk-sharing is a notion that has been developed in the macroeconomic literature 
independently from the context of monetary unions and is linked to international financial 
integration (e.g. Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1996). Economic theory has long recognised the potential 
benefits of open capital markets, both in the direction of promoting growth and smoothing the 
time profile of consumption and investment, but also of diversifying idiosyncratic country-
specific risks.1  
In the 1990s, the experiment of European monetary integration inspired a considerable body 
of empirical research on international risk-sharing (e.g. Sorensen & Yosha, 1998). However, 
interest in the concept has only gained significant prominence among policy-makers following 
the euro area crisis. The recent focus on international risk-sharing marks a shift in the thinking 
about the functioning of EMU, departing from the optimum currency area (OCA) theory, which 
represented the theoretical framework of reference during the construction of EMU.2 
While the OCA theory has evolved significantly over the years, after the seminal work of 
Mundell (1961), the linkages between and the consistency of principles across the OCA theory 
and international risk-sharing theory have been rarely investigated. Policy prescriptions based 
on the different formulations of the OCA theories tend to support measures aiming to increase 
the flexibility of prices (and wages) and the mobility of factors of production in order to absorb 
the impact of asymmetric shocks through market mechanisms. From this viewpoint, other than 
structural reforms, both financial and commercial cross-country market integration is seen as 
beneficial3 to the extent that it contributes to higher cross-country synchronisation of business 
                                                     
* I am indebted to Andrea Fracasso, Daniel Gros and Niels Thygesen for insightful discussions and comments. 
1 Still, despite the continuing process of financial integration and globalisation, it is unclear whether such benefits are 
fully exploited in actual practice. 
2 In the end, the idea of building a framework for nominal convergence (Maastricht criteria) was preferred to the 
prescription of the OCA theory, which was more strongly oriented towards real convergence. 
3 See endogenous OCA theory, Frenkel & Rose (1997 and 1998). 
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cycles. Under these circumstances, the cost of giving up national sovereignty over monetary 
policy in favour of a common policy is thus reduced.  
In risk-sharing theory, which formalises how disconnecting domestic consumption dynamics 
from domestic income is beneficial when a country is hit by an asymmetric shock, a certain 
degree of heterogeneity across business cycles does not pose a risk, but rather is potentially an 
asset, as it increases the room for international diversification (Imbs & Mauro, 2007). From a 
theoretical point of view, asset portfolio diversification (to hedge against adverse states of 
nature) allows a country to diversify income sources across-borders, which in principle is only 
feasible when output growth rates across countries display different dynamics. In order to reap 
these benefits, financial integration is usually considered a necessary condition for increasing 
the completeness of markets (expanding the set of available assets per state of the economy). 
This implies that both the OCA theory and the international risk-sharing theory prescribe 
market integration for their functioning but for different, and even opposite, purposes. While 
becoming an ‘OCA’ implies further flexibility for a better synchronisation of business cycles, the 
risk-sharing approach focuses on the cross-country synchronisation of consumption, taking 
differences in output growth as an opportunity for diversification. 
The increasing attention paid to the concept of risk-sharing has been driven by a desire to 
understand the drivers of the (more) successful experience of existing federations, in particular 
the US, in the face of the financial crisis. In this respect, the limited capacity of EMU to face 
shocks is often attributed to the low level of market-based risk-sharing. In this sense, the euro 
area appears to contrast with the high degree of private risk-sharing in the US. Evidence of such 
feature of the US economy is found in an influential paper by Asdrubali et al. (1996), who argue 
that over 60% of shocks to a US state are smoothed through market mechanisms. However, 
economic literature focusing on alternative approaches, for instance Del Negro (2007), reaches 
the conclusion that that inter-state risk-sharing may be significantly more limited.  
Beyond methodological considerations, one fundamental problem is that an accurate 
measurement of inter-state private risk-sharing is made difficult by the limited availability of 
data, namely bilateral cross-country income flows. This implies that the measurement of 
private risk-sharing in the end has to rely on approximations, which may entail measurement 
errors, or which embed different mechanisms to absorb the impact of shocks. 
Against this background, this paper seeks to provide a comprehensive comparison of risk-
sharing (and consumption-smoothing) patterns in the US and the euro area, focusing on the 
role of markets.4  
As a first step, it presents stylised facts, in the vein of Del Negro (2007), to provide evidence of 
the ‘broad’ degree of international risk-sharing based on the comparison of consumption and 
output correlations patterns within the US and euro area over time. It then uses the framework 
of Adsrubali et al. (1996) to analyse and compare different channels for risk-sharing and 
                                                     
4 See Alcidi & Thirion (2017) for an in-depth analysis of the role of fiscal institutions in the US vs. the EA. 
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consumption-smoothing. In order to do this, we first review some measurement and data 
issues relevant for measuring international risk-sharing and, above all, for the correct 
comparison between the two regions.  
The results stemming from the two parts are then compared. The objective is not to reconcile 
the findings of the two different methodologies, but rather to investigate changes over time 
and compare patterns across the two regions.  
Lastly, we attempt to explain the differences between the two regions by looking into whether 
the different capacities to absorb shocks, and international risk-sharing in particular, can be 
related to the persistence of shocks. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews key findings of the literature 
on how the impact of shocks can be smoothed through different channels in the US and Europe, 
and presents a few stylised facts about international risk-sharing. In section 3, we offer an 
appraisal of the different channels of income and consumption-smoothing in the US and the 
EA, using fully comparable data. Section 4 attempts to explain the main differences, based on 
features of the euro area and on differences in the persistence of shocks. Section 5 concludes.  
2. International risk-sharing and consumption-smoothing 
In macroeconomics, the international risk-sharing framework is based on the assumption that 
country-specific shocks5 cannot be avoided, but their effects can be distributed over other 
countries (spatial or cross-country risk-sharing) to reduce their impact on domestic 
consumption. The literature focusing on the performance of federations in terms of absorbing 
the impact of asymmetric shocks considers not only mechanisms for spatial risk-sharing 
(income-smoothing) but also intertemporal risk-sharing or, as it usually called consumption-
smoothing. The latter refers to the possibility to smooth the impact of shocks on consumption 
(and welfare) also over time, by intertemporal choices about savings and consumption, through 
access to domestic and international credit markets. 
In the context of a pool of countries, like the euro area or a fully-fledged federation like the US, 
cross-country risk-sharing is provided at a private level by the international ownership of assets 
and international wage transfers,6 usually called international factor income, as well at the fiscal 
level (if it exists), by cross-country transfers of fiscal resources, for instance from a federal 
budget. Consumption-smoothing, instead, is determined by intertemporal choices in spending 
and saving of both the private sector (households and corporations) and the (national) 
government. 
                                                     
5 Or the asymmetric effect of common shocks. We are not able to distinguish the two cases. 
6 It should be noted that in this context, ‘international’ refers to cross-state transfers within the US federation. Similarly, 
in the EA, it refers to transfers across euro area member states. This clarification, which is conceptually important, is not 
accounted for when it comes to the empirical analysis because existing data are simply flows from/to individual states 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and it is not possible to distinguish the part that remains within the US federation or within 
the EA from the total.      
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The most widely used framework to measure the different channels (i.e. international factor 
income, transfers and savings) through which the impact of an output shock is absorbed is the 
one formulated by Asdrubali et al. (1996) and refined in Sorensen & Yosha (1998), and this is 
based on a (GDP) variance decomposition approach.  
The key finding of Asdrubali et al. (1996), who analysed US data between 1963 and 1990, is 
that 39% of the shocks to the per capita gross product of individual states in the US is smoothed 
on average through transactions on capital markets, 23% through consumption-smoothing, a 
small part (13%) by the federal tax-transfer and grant system and 25% of shocks is not 
smoothed. 
This suggests that although perfect insurance is not achieved, there is considerable risk-sharing 
among US states. These results are broadly confirmed by more recent data, as shown in the 
next section.    
Sorensen & Yosha (1998) analyse risk-sharing patterns among EU member states  (and also 
OECD countries) between 1966 and 1990, and show that less than 50% of the shock is 
smoothed, well below the 75% of the US, and find that this is achieved through corporate 
savings and budget deficits,7 not through capital markets.  
The work of Furceri & Zzdienicka (2013), which analyses risk-sharing patterns for 15 euro area 
member states between 1979 and 2010, confirms that factor income flows do not contribute 
to smooth income across countries in the euro area and that risk-sharing mechanisms are 
particularly ineffective during financial crises. Since factor income flows, which form the most 
important component of income smoothing, are driven by capital markets integration, the 
finding seems to suggest that European capital markets are less integrated than US capital 
markets and that this has remained a fact even after the creation of the single currency.8  
Against this background, we start our analysis from the theory on international risk-sharing and 
try to establish some stylised facts about it, drawing on US and the euro area data over several 
decades.  
2.1 Stylised facts on the US and the euro area 
International risk-sharing is grounded on the idea that access to international financial markets 
leads to international diversification of country risks by allowing for a diversification of portfolio 
opportunities. An optimal portfolio allocation implies that consumption in one country is only 
affected by symmetric risks, which are not insurable through diversification. As a result, the 
correlation in (the growth rate of) consumption across the countries of the pool considered – 
                                                     
7 Interestingly, as the authors note, this needs no actual international flow of funds as it can happen simply through 
changes in domestic savings without international borrowing or lending.  
8 See, for instance Allard et al. (2013) and Allard et al. (2014). 
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the US or the EA in our case – should be high, while the correlation between domestic 
consumption and domestic output should be low.   
In a more sophisticated fashion, the degree of risk-sharing can be assessed based on the 
following two inequalities of correlations:9 
 𝑐𝑜𝑟(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑤) < 𝑐𝑜𝑟(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖, 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑤) (1) 
 𝑐𝑜𝑟(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖) < 𝑐𝑜𝑟(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑤) (2) 
Where CONS and GDP indicate growth rates of consumption and output, respectively, and the 
subscript i stands for domestic (state or member state) and w for the pool of countries (either 
US or EA), respectively. 
Inequality (1) implies that correlations in GDP (between each US state and the whole US and 
between each EA member state and the whole EA) should be lower than correlations in 
consumption (between each same state, or member state, and the respective region). This 
inequality is based on the idea that additional flows of international income (associated with 
non-nationals and non-residents and hence not captured by GDP) affects consumption and 
disconnects it from domestic GDP. Under the hypothesis of complete markets, one should 
expect 𝑐𝑜𝑟(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑤)  = 1. 
Inequality (2) implies that the correlations between domestic consumption and domestic 
output should be lower than correlations between domestic consumption and output in the 
rest of the region. Likewise for inequality (1), this is the case in the presence of international 
income insurance through large cross-country factor income flows and international transfers, 
which are captured by the income but not by the national GDP.   
The figures below show the four correlations involved in the two inequalities above over two 
different time samples (to account for the break associated with the introduction of the single 
currency in Europe and with sample data revisions in the US), both for the US and the euro 
area.  
Overall it is quite interesting to note that, at first sight, the difference between the US and EA 
is not as dramatic as one might imagine based on the common understanding that risk-sharing 
in the US is much larger than in the euro area, and this seems to be the case both before and 
after 1998. Below we consider the figures in detail.   
The first condition for international risk-sharing – as defined in inequality (1) –  is that the 
consumption correlation coefficients must be higher than GDP correlation coefficients 
(comparison between the first and second set of bars in the two figures). In the period 1998-
2013, the consumption correlation among US states is about 0.9 (not far from 1, which would 
be consistent with full risk-sharing) and is higher than in the EA countries (0.8) and higher than 
GDP correlations (91% against 87%). This was not the case in the years 1975-1997, and it is still 
                                                     
9 Correlation is defined, as usual, as a ratio of covariance of the product of standard deviations and it ranges between -
1 and 1. 
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not the case in the EA (80% against 85%). This result implies no meaningful risk-sharing over 
that period. In both regions, consumption correlations have substantially increased since 1998 
(bars are higher for the more recent sample) and in the US overtook correlations in GSP (gross 
state product), hinting at risk-sharing. This finding seems to be consistent with the idea that 
financial liberalisation, which took place from the 1990s onwards at global scale, led to greater 
financial integration and increased the completeness of markets and hence diversification 
opportunities. In the euro area the process of financial integration, which was driven and 
reinforced by the creation of the single currency, seems (we are not claiming causality) to have 
led to an increased correlation in consumption across member states.  
Figure 1. (Real per capita) Consumption and GDP correlations, US (LHS panel) and euro area 
(RHS panel), 1975-1997 and 1998-2013 
 
Note: EA-11 = Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece. The bars 
depict cross-country average correlation coefficients, calculated over the periods 1975-1997 and 1998-2013. Reported 
correlation coefficients are respectively between domestic (i.e. state or member state) and US/EA output growth; domestic 
and US/EA consumption growth; domestic consumption and domestic output growth; domestic consumption growth and 
US/EA output growth. 
Source: Authors’ formulation. 
Backus et al. (1992),10 Baxter (1995), Stockman & Tesar (1995) and Sorensen & Yosha (1998) all 
investigated risk-sharing, focusing on the comparison between cross-country GDP and 
consumption correlations until the 1990s, and find that consumption correlations were lower 
than output correlations, which is similar to what the light bars in Figure 1 indicate. This finding 
was usually interpreted as evidence against full risk-sharing, but Sorensen & Yosha (1998) point 
out that it is more than that. While the lack of full risk-sharing is consistent with consumption 
correlations lower than 1, the lack of risk-sharing cannot explain consumption correlations that 
are smaller than output correlations. This is a well-documented international consumption 
correlation puzzle in the literature. Stockman & Tesar (1995) advance the hypothesis that low 
consumption correlation is consistent with risk-sharing when countries face taste shocks. If this 
                                                     
10 They are the first to introduce the so-called ‘quantity anomaly’, the evidence that de-trended consumption is less 
correlated cross-country than output. 
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hypothesis is true, such shocks are still important in the euro area, while their role in the US 
has decreased over time.11 
Del Negro (2002) argues that the problem is not necessarily shocks in preferences, but one of 
measurement and contends that interstate risk-sharing in the US is lower than reported in 
Asdrubali et al. (1996) because of a measurement error in the output when using such 
approach. 
Inequality (2), which posits that the correlation between domestic consumption and domestic 
GDP should be lower than correlation between domestic consumption and the output of the 
whole region (comparison of the third and fourth sets of bars in Figure 1) is never satisfied, for 
any region in any time period. 
Overall, the above findings suggest poor evidence of international risk-sharing before 1997, in 
line with previous literature, and a change after that; indeed correlation in cross-country 
consumption becomes higher than output after 1998. In the US international risk-sharing is not 
full but higher than in the euro area, where the key condition is not satisfied. 
The two panels in Figure 2 compare the patterns (in growth rates) of output and consumption 
dispersion for the US and the euro area. Unlike correlation, cross-sectional dispersion measures 
the distance from the average and gives a sense of heterogeneity within the region. In practice, 
high correlation could coexist with high dispersion, which would capture differences in the 
magnitude of growth rates.  
A shown, consumption dispersion in the US is very stable and lower than in the euro area, 
especially after 2008. In the euro area, dispersion in consumption seems to mimic GDP 
dispersion and its increase is likely to be related to the different way the crisis played out across 
euro area member states. This implies that in the US, GSP growth rate differences are higher 
than consumption growth rate differences,12 which may suggest that mechanisms are in place 
that allow for consumption to be less sensitive to swings in GSP. This is usually taken as evidence 
to support international risk-sharing (see Del Negro, 2002). The same is not true for the euro 
area, which tends to display a lower degree of dispersion in GDP compared to the US but a 
higher degree of heterogeneity in consumption.  
                                                     
11 This could also explain why consumption correlation increases while the fraction of smoothed shocks in the US, as 
estimated in the next section, is constant over time. Indeed, the Asdrubali et al. (1996) methodology is immune to taste 
shocks (see Sorensen & Yosha, 1998, p. 231)   
12 As shown in Alcidi & Thirion (2017), a similar finding holds when comparing GSP and changes in employment rates.  
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Figure 2. Cross-section dispersion in GDP growth (panel a) and consumption growth (panel b): 
EA11 vs. US states (1998-2013) 
  
Note: The dispersion in output and consumption growth rates (real per capita) is measured as the respective standard deviation 
among EA and US countries.  
Source: Authors’ computations based on OECD national account for EA countries, and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US 
Department of Commerce.  
In sum, the correlation approach suggests that after 1998 there seems to be evidence of inter-
state risk-sharing in the US, while this is not the case in the euro area.   
Figure 3 moves away from the US-EA comparison and sheds light on the risk-sharing differences 
across euro area member states, by displaying the four correlations in inequalities (1) and (2) 
by country. The data suggest that the aggregate picture (averages) as shown in Figure 1 hides 
substantial cross-country differences.  
Figure 3. Real per capita consumption and GDP correlations between domestic and euro area 
growth rates, EA member states, 1998-2013 
 
Note: Correlation coefficients are calculated over the period 1998-2013 for each country. Reported coefficients are respectively 
between domestic and EA GDP growth; domestic and EA consumption growth; domestic consumption and domestic output 
growth; domestic consumption growth and EA output growth. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on OECD national account data. 
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The special feature of Germany is patent. Consumption seems to follow very peculiar dynamics, 
completely disconnected from domestic GDP and consumption in the rest of the area. Austria 
also displays similar features. Such disconnection seems to suggest that Germany and Austria 
are able insulate their consumption patterns from GDP fluctuations, but this is not the result of 
risk-sharing with other euro area member states. It could be either the result of risk-sharing at 
international level (outside the EA) or consumption-smoothing through domestic savings 
and/or absorption. Interestingly, few countries satisfy the condition that output correlation is 
lower than consumption correlation (comparison of the first and second bar for each country), 
as predicted by the risk-sharing theory; these are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. This 
is the ‘usual’ group of peripheral euro area countries, which received large capital inflows 
during the early years of monetary union, grew at high rates and, above all, were able to 
substantially increase their consumption. Since 2010, they have been hit hard by the crisis and 
their GDP growth fell more than in the rest of the euro area. Yet, the very high level (on average 
over the 16 years) of consumption correlation (in Spain and Italy it is close to 1) suggests that 
some mechanisms work in the direction of disconnecting GDP dynamics for consumption 
dynamics. Other than the usual intertemporal (savings and fiscal policy) and market 
mechanisms, the ECB interventions in support of banks and the emergency support facilities 
(EFSF and others) may have played a role.   
3. Comparing risk-sharing in the US and the EMU  
Against the prima facie evidence of limited risk-sharing in the euro area and a lower degree of 
risk-sharing than in the US, this section enriches the analysis by following the standard 
framework used in the literature, as initiated by Asdrubali et al. (1996), to measure risk-sharing 
in response to GDP shocks. This consists of applying a variance decomposition of shocks to GDP 
in order to quantify the share of smoothing achieved via the various channels. It is based on 
national accounting and the starting point is the disaggregation of member states’ GDP (GSP 
for the US states) into: national income (NI), net national disposable income (NNDI) and total 
consumption (C+G). From these aggregates, we identify the following channels through which 
GDP shocks are smoothed: 
GDP-NI =international income transfers (factor income flows)  
NI-NNDI = net international taxes and transfers  
NNDI-(C+G) = total (private and public) net savings  
We then consider the following identity: 
(1) 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 =
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝐼𝑖
𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑖
(𝐶 + 𝐺)𝑖
∗ (𝐶 + 𝐺)𝑖 
Taking logs and first differences (1), we obtain four equations, which come down to a simple 
variance decomposition of GDP into four factors, the (so-called) market channel (measured by 
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the international factor income), international transfers, net total savings and consumption 
being the last one.13 
Before focusing on the outcome of the regression estimates, we first look into the features of 
the data to ensure full comparability between the US and the euro area.  
The dataset for the US states is built following Asdrubali et al. (1996). Detailed information on 
the construction of the time series is available in their seminal paper and the description of the 
main elements are summarised in Box 1. As already mentioned in Sorensen & Yosha (1998), US 
and euro area data are not readily comparable, because of the different degree of richness of 
data at the level of euro area member states and US states. US states’ data are poorer; in 
particular, GNI does not exist at the level of each state. The problem is overcome by building a 
database14 starting from information on income, taxes, contributions and transfers at personal 
level, which is then used to derive the state income (SI). The latter is taken as a proxy for GNI. 
By contrast, for the euro area countries, GNI comes directly from national accounts and data 
are much more detailed, including at the sectoral level.  
One crucial implication of the US approach in building states’ statistics is that the difference 
between GSP and SI in the US includes not only international factor income but also net savings 
from the corporate sector (mostly retained earnings), which in the euro area statistics is part 
of the total net savings (often called the credit channel) and not accounted for in the difference 
between GDP and GNI. The latter is factor income, in a ‘proper’ sense.  
As a consequence, without adjusting the data, the comparison of the different channels 
between the US and the EA will be biased. The so-called capital market channel (in broad sense, 
the factor income) is over-estimated in the US relative to the EA and, in the EA, the net savings 
(or credit) channel is overestimated relative to the US (provided that corporate savings 
contribute positively to consumption-smoothing). 
Box 1. Understanding US data  
US data are available for the period 1963-2013; they are state-level, yearly, real and per-capita. 
Gross State Product (GSP) is the ‘value added’ of the industries at the state level.   
State Income (SI) is composed of personal income15 (income received by persons from all sources), 
federal and state (and local) non-personal taxes (and contributions), and interest on state and local 
funds, minus public direct transfers. At the national level, State Income roughly corresponds to Gross 
National Income (GNI).  
                                                     
13 The detailed derivation of the equations and steps of the estimates can be found in Alcidi & Thirion (2016). 
14 We are grateful to B. Sorensen for providing us with information about the time series used in the original estimates. 
15 Personal income is the sum of wages, salaries, supplements to wages and salaries, proprietor’s income with inventory 
valuation adjustment and capital consumption adjustment (CCAdj), rental income of persons with CCAdj, personal 
income receipts on assets (dividends and interests), personal current transfer receipts less contributions for government 
social insurance. 
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Disposable State Income (DSI)   
Disposable state income is composed of state income plus federal aid to state and local governments, 
plus federal transfers to individuals (unemployment benefit), minus federal personal and non-
personal taxes.   
Net Federal Transfers to States 
Net federal transfers to states are defined as the sum of federal aid to state governments, federal 
transfers to individuals (unemployment benefits and other transfers to individuals), minus federal 
personal and non-personal taxes (direct, social security and indirect).   
State16 Government Net Savings 
State Government net savings is the difference between government disposable income and 
government final consumption or the difference between current revenues and current 
expenditures. Government disposable income is the sum of (state non-personal) taxes, federal aid to 
states and other revenues, minus direct transfers to individual and state consumption. 
State Consumption 
State consumption is defined as the sum of private and public (state and local governments) 
consumption. Private consumption by state is only available since 1997; as in Asdrubali et al. (1996), 
to obtain the previous years we rescale the total retail sales by the ratio of aggregate US private 
consumption to aggregate US retail sales.     
Lastly, capital depreciation, which is usually estimated as a separate channel for the EA, cannot 
be isolated at the level of US states and is included in the capital market channel. This is a fixed 
proportion of the capital stock, so it tends to be highly pro-cyclical (hence, it tends to reduce 
risk-sharing) and is not very informative, but can be quite large. 
3.1 Main results: US vs. EA 
Against this background, we begin by presenting the estimates of the channels for shock 
absorption as usually presented when comparing the US and the euro area (figure 4, LHS), and 
then the estimates based on adjusted data which yield comparable estimates for the US and 
euro area (figure 4, RHS).  
We start by showing the main results for the period 1998-2013, and then provide a breakdown 
to account for the effect of the different stages of financial crisis. This time period was chosen 
because in the euro area the separation of retained corporate savings from household savings 
is not available before 1996, and US data exhibit a structural break due to a methodological 
change in the collection of GSP and consumption data in 1997.17 In order to obtain a so-called 
‘capital market’ variable comparable to the US, we add corporate savings and the capital 
                                                     
16 Including local governments. 
17 Gross state product (GSP), issued by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), changed from SIC industry definitions 
to NAICS industry definitions in 1997. Personal consumption data are only available after 1997.   
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depreciation18 to the international factor income. Conversely, corporate savings are removed 
from net savings in the EA. While this allows for an accurate comparison of the respective 
channels, it is important to note that the amount of income-smoothing provided by capital 
markets does not necessarily fully consist of cross-border components (i.e. corporate savings 
do not involve cross-border income-smoothing). 
In the case of the euro area we consider only 11 member states, namely the current members 
with the exception of the new member states (namely the Baltic states, Slovakia and Slovenia), 
because data are not available for most years, and Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus, which are 
very small and atypical. 
Figure 4. Income and consumption-smoothing in the US vs. EA-11  
                  No-adjustment in data (left panel)                          Fully comparable data (right panel), 1998-2013 
 
 
Source: Authors’ computations based on US Bureau of Economic Analysis and OECD national account data. 
The US results (Figure 4) are in line with the findings from the literature presented above, 
although the time period is different and covers only the most recent years. Compared to the 
results of Asdrubali et al. (1996), the absorption of shocks through capital markets and 
consumption-smoothing (essentially personal savings and state-level fiscal policy) has 
remained unchanged compared to 1963-1990. At the same time, the role of federal transfers 
has slightly decreased in recent years (8% compared to 13% in the original study of Asdrubali 
et al. (1996)).The results for the EA (no adjustment) also confirm previous findings from the 
literature (eg. Furceri & Zdzienicka, 2013). They validate a very limited role of capital markets, 
a dominant role of savings and a large (as much as three times as in the US) share of the impact 
of shocks not smoothed.  
                                                     
18 Capital depreciation cannot be isolated in the US data. 
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The results shown in the right panel of Figure 4 are those with comparable data for the euro 
area. Findings (Figure 4, RHS) indicate that while coefficient estimates are slightly affected, the 
overall message emerging from previous findings does not change substantially. The so-called 
capital market channel plays a large role in the US while it is very limited in the EA. Hence, 
accounting for the new aggregation does not seem to be crucial, at least on average. However, 
given that the 16 years we considered have been characterised by large cyclical swings and a 
profound crisis, time averages may hide large differences. We therefore break down the time 
sample into sub-periods and assess whether the results still hold.  
Figure 5. US-EA comparison by sub-periods (comparable data), 1998-2013 
 
 
Note: 2008-09 are very special years, with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and then the coordinated fiscal stimulus. 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
In section 5, we present a time breakdown of the empirical results presented on the left panel 
of figure 4 with adjusted euro area data. Breaking up the sample into sub-periods (see Figure 
5, left panel), we find that US fiscal transfer absorption capacity, as provided by the federal 
budget, is overall limited and even has fallen during 2010-2013, suggesting that the US fiscal 
stimulus did not focus on smoothing asymmetric shocks. Yet, in the US the unsmoothed part of 
the shock remains small, although it slightly increased in recent years – which may partially be 
a direct reflection of the relatively low absorption through inter-state transfers during – but 
much less than in the EA.  
Interestingly, capital markets and consumption-smoothing (driven by personal savings) exhibit 
the largest variability; the role of capital markets appears to have declined since the eruption 
of the financial crisis, while that of savings has increased (with a dramatic increase during the 
peak of the crisis), but their sum has almost remained constant over time (see section 3.2 for 
more details on the US). Despite its significant decline in 2008-2009, the capital markets 
channel has recovered in 2010-2013, and remains the most powerful way to absorb shocks. 
In the euro area, still under the new aggregation, capital markets seem to perform significantly 
better in 1998-2009 than what we had found on average. This is true at least in the first two 
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sub-periods. Although one would ideally compare the respective role of corporate saving in the 
US with the EA, the finding that using comparable estimates leads to a much smaller (yet 
significant) discrepancy between the US and the EA is a crucial result of this study. On the one 
hand, it qualifies the gap between both regions during ‘normal times’. On the other hand, it 
points to the importance of well-functioning capital market integration during a prolonged 
crisis.  
After 2010, the so-called capital market channel collapses and de-smooth the impact of the 
shocks in the EA (figure 5, RHS). This can be explained by several factors. First, in the new 
aggregation of data the capital market channel includes capital depreciation, which appears to 
be relatively large, up to 10 percentage points, and highly pro-cyclical.19 Second, according to 
the finding from Sorensen & Yosha (1998), corporate savings account for half of the smoothing 
in the EA. However, as shown in Alcidi et al. (2017), the smoothing role of corporate savings 
collapsed during the 2010-2013 period. This is in line with the evidence that savings are 
sensitive to the cycle and tend to not work properly when negative shocks hit.20 The weak 
performance of the comparable measure of capital market in the euro area thus seems to 
explain why incorporating corporate savings into capital market smoothing did not affect the 
results significantly. As argued by Asdrubali et al. (1996), this is compounded with the fact that 
larger shocks weigh more heavily on the coefficient estimates, which means that the low 
amount of smoothing during the crisis has a relatively larger impact on the overall coefficient 
estimate.  
In the euro area, net savings (excluding corporate savings) have provided relatively limited 
shock absorption and even less over the last sub-period (2010-2013), which was marked by a 
collapse of consumption smoothing through government budgets (Alcidi and Thirion, 2007). To 
some extent, the growing unsmoothed part can be understood as the result of savings’ 
inefficiency in the face of persistent or permanent shocks.  
In order to shed light on this point, we first look into specific dynamics of two euro area country 
groups, the core and the periphery; and second, we try to appreciate the potentially different 
role of the nature of shocks in the US and in the EA.  
3.2 Euro area internal dynamics  
As in Alcidi & Thirion (2016), we start by clustering euro area countries into two groups, core 
and periphery, where core includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Finland while periphery includes Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece and then compare 
the performance of the different channels. 
                                                     
19 It is such by definition, given that it is computed as a fixed percentage of fixed capital formation, which by its nature 
is highly pro-cyclical.  
20 See also Furceri & Zdzienicka (2013) on this point. 
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Figure 6. Income and consumption-smoothing in EA core versus periphery (US-like 
aggregation)  
  
 
Note: The channels are measured according to the US aggregation, and hence corporate savings are accounted in the capital 
markets channel. This explains why results do not exactly match the findings of Alcidi & Thirion (2016). 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
The two charts in Figure 6 show that capital markets and consumption-smoothing exhibit a high 
volatility over time and great variance across the two country groups, especially after 2007 
(except transfers, which always have a zero smoothing property). In particular, the unsmoothed 
part of the shock is systematically higher in the periphery than in the core. However, it is only 
in the latest years of the sample that this went well above the 60% found in the literature, 
mostly due to the lack of any smoothing coming either from savings or factor income. The 
higher resilience to shocks in the core countries after 2007 is fully explained by savings in the 
corporate sector (especially in the 2008-09 period) and then personal and public savings (after 
2010).21 
The charts above also suggest that the results for the euro area as a whole are largely driven 
by dynamics in the periphery, where the capacity to absorb shocks has been always lower. 
3.3 US international long-term patterns in risk-sharing and consumption-smoothing 
In this sub-section we focus on the US and look at how risk-sharing and consumption-smoothing 
patterns have evolved over almost 50 years, between 1965 and 2013, using full data availability. 
Using the same methodology as before, based on Asdrubali et al. (1996), we identify the 
effectiveness of different channels in smoothing the impact of shocks and illustrate them using 
five-year rolling windows. 
As shown in Figure 7, the share of GSP shocks that remains unsmoothed has lingered below 
30% for almost the 50 years considered and slightly declined, on average, from over 20% before 
1993, to below 20% in the following period. The degree of income shock-smoothing through 
                                                     
21 See Alcidi et al. (2017) for a detailed analysis of the behaviour of net savings. 
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factor income (the blue line) has increased dramatically until the 1990s and then moved, 
following large cyclical swings. At the same time, the smoothing via net savings was on a 
declining trend until the early 1990s; after that it started to increase with an inverse u-shape 
pattern during the 1990s, and then grew again. Such an increase in the use of credit markets 
for risk-sharing purposes may have arisen from the increase in access to borrowing during the 
2000s. In parallel, the amount of income shocks smoothed via international capital markets has 
fallen for more than a decade (since mid-2000s). As argued above, the Lehman crisis may have 
hit the functioning of the international market channel. It is not yet possible to assess whether 
this is a temporary or a long-lasting phenomenon. Interestingly, from the picture it emerges 
that international factor income mirrors the savings channel and their sum remains almost 
constant over time, at least since the mid-1970s. 
To better understand the interaction between these two channels, we run a Granger causality 
test, to test the hypothesis that the functioning of capital markets affects the net savings. In 
other words, we want to test whether changes in the capacity to smooth shocks through the 
capital markets leads (in the Granger sense) to changes in the consumption-smoothing through 
savings and borrowing.  
Figure 7. Channels of inter-state risk-sharing and consumption-smoothing 5-year rolling 
windows, 1965-2013 
 
Note: 1965 refers to period 1965-1970 and 2008 to 2008-13.  
Source: Authors’ formulation22. 
The formulation of this hypothesis is based on the findings of Asdrubali & Kim (2004),23 who 
analyse the interaction between international risk-sharing (fiscal or through capital markets) 
and inter-temporal consumption-smoothing (through net savings) channels in the US. They find 
                                                     
22 the values of the unsmoothed part for the years 1968-1973 rolling windows are not significantly different from zero 
23 They use a panel VAR, so a different framework, to assess the interaction between risk-sharing and consumption-
smoothing. 
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that international capital markets and (federal) fiscal risk-sharing channels tend to be 
complementary and crowd out (or reduce) the consumption-smoothing through savings. The 
explanation put forward by Asdrubali & Kim (2004) is that capital markets and fiscal transfers 
are ex-ante insurance mechanisms; they exist as a tool to deal with potential future shocks. On 
the other hand, consumption-smoothing is an ex-post mechanism, which eventually is triggered 
after the shocks have occurred and only when the other (ex-ante) channels are not able to fully 
absorb the initial shock. If this hypothesis is true, we should find that the capital market leads 
the credit market channel and reject a causality going from consumption-smoothing to the 
factor income. 
The results of the Granger causality test24 confirm the hypothesis that the amount of 
consumption-smoothing is determined by the absorption capacity of the capital markets, while 
the causality in the other direction is always rejected. An important implication of this is that if 
income smoothing through international capital markets is weak and net savings, especially 
private savings, are affected by the cycle and the persistence of the shocks in times of long 
negative shock, the impact of GDP shocks tend to translate more widely on consumption. In 
the next section we focus on the issue of the persistence of shocks.    
4. Transitory and persistent shocks  
We now look at whether the different capacity to absorb shocks between the US and the euro 
area can be explained, at least partially, by the different nature of shocks or structural features 
of shocks.  
Following the permanent income theory, if a negative shock is persistent or permanent, 
personal savings are not effective in smoothing consumption. Moreover, credit institutions 
tend to reduce their credit supply in the face of long-lasting shocks. For the same reason, 
governments may have only limited capacity to access credit markets to borrow. This implies 
that in regions like the euro area, where savings seem to play an important role in reducing the 
impact of shocks, negative persistent shocks are unlikely to be smoothed effectively. By 
contrast, given its nature, international risk-sharing through capital markets should be 
‘immune’ to persistent shocks, as far as shocks are uncorrelated across countries. This would 
put the US in a better position than the euro area in the face of long, negative shocks. 
                                                     
24 We perform the pairwise Granger causality test using 1, 2 and 3 lags, for each of the two alternative hypotheses. 
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Figure 8. Income and consumption-smoothing at different differencing intervals, from 1 and 
up to 5 years, euro area and US (1998-2013) 
  
Note: The channels are measured according to the US aggregation; hence corporate savings and capital depreciation are in the 
capital markets. 
Source: Authors’ formulation. 
In order to take these considerations into account, we consider the patterns of risk-sharing 
among euro area countries and US states at one and five-year intervals. This should give us a 
sense of what happens to the effectiveness of channels when the shock lasts not one year but 
five years. For the purpose of having better insight into the different categories of net savings, 
we split governments’ budgets from personal/households savings. On the one hand, the results 
can help to empirically assess whether the (close to) 50% capital market income smoothing 
among US states (shown in Figure 4) is driven mostly by factor income flows rather than by 
corporate savings patterns, as argued earlier. In the Asdrubali et al. (1996) framework, the 
capital markets channel in the US remains stable (actually increasing) when considering longer 
differential intervals. In that context, the conclusion was that corporate savings did not play a 
great role, because corporations do not smooth distributed profits at the three-year horizon 
and above, and hence the core absorption capacity had to come from the international factor 
income. Our results, as shown in Figure 9, show that the role of capital markets declines when 
considering longer time intervals, and that at the three-year and above horizon, it falls by about 
one-quarter, suggesting that something has changed compared to the period before 1990.  
The picture is much bleaker in the euro area, where capital markets’ capacity to absorb the 
impact of a shock is not only reduced when the differencing interval lengthens, it disappears 
after four years. In fact, this is in line with previous findings whereby private market risk-sharing 
was very limited and corporate savings (included in the same channel), which provide some 
absorption capacity, are unable to respond to long-lasting shocks. In the euro area, the only 
resilient channel is net government savings, which is nothing but fiscal policy at the level of the 
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member states.25 This is also in line with previous findings, whereby consumption-smoothing 
among OECD countries is not driven by personal savings, but rather by national government 
savings, and the role of the latter tends to increase at longer time intervals as government 
spending becomes effective with a lag (see Asdrubali et al., 1996). 
As some of the results for the US seem to contradict previous findings, we try to isolate the 
response to transitory from permanent shocks using a different methodology. For this purpose, 
rather than looking at longer differencing intervals, we analyse the pattern of income and 
consumption-smoothing for states facing persistent shocks and states facing transitory shocks. 
As a measure of the persistence of fluctuations, we use the one proposed by Campbell & 
Mankiw (1987).26, 27 As in Asdrubali et al. (1996), in order to keep the number of parameters 
reasonably low, we estimate an autoregressive model with three lags. We then split our sample 
into two groups: states with highly persistent shocks to GDP growth, namely the top third, and 
the rest. In doing so we find that over the period considered, the inertia coefficient of the GDP 
series is 1.45 for the high persistence group and 0.83 for the low persistence group.28 Once the 
country groups are identified, we again measure the performance of the different channels for 
risk-sharing. Figure 9 records the results and these are in line with those yielded from the 
previous methodology, and as shown in Figure 8. The role of capital markets is higher for 
transitory shocks, while the contribution of personal savings does not significantly decline, 
moving from transitory to persistent shocks. Lastly, previous findings relative to the role of 
federal transfers and state budgetary policy (public savings) remain valid. 
                                                     
25 See Alcidi & Thirion (2017) for an in-depth analysis on the effectiveness of this channel. 
26 This measure is based on the coefficients of an autoregressive process for the US states’ GSP. The measure is equal to 
1
(1−∑ 𝜌𝑖)
𝑝
1=1
 where the 𝜌𝑖are the p coefficients of the AR(p) process ∆𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖∆𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
1=1  
27 Unfortunately, the exercise can only be done for the US, as the number of observations for the euro area is too low 
(because of the number of countries) to be relevant. 
28 Interestingly, in Asdrubali et al. (1996), where the period considered was 1965-1990, the average persistence 
coefficient for the high-persistence group was 1.72, whereas for the low-persistence group it is 0.96. Both measures are 
higher than in our sample. 
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Figure 9. Income and consumption-smoothing, transitory and persistent shocks to GSP, US 
(1998-2013) 
 
Source: Authors’ formulation. 
How can the drop in capital market channels and the resilience in personal savings be 
explained? It is difficult to find accounts supported by empirical evidence, but here we advance 
two hypotheses based on the narrative. The first hypothesis is that the role played by corporate 
savings (included in the capital market channel) increased after the 1990s and resulted in a 
smaller part of the shock that is absorbed when the length of the interval increases. However, 
this hypothesis is not consistent with other findings. As illustrated by the estimates in Figure 4, 
which measure transitory shocks, the capital market channel as a whole has declined over time 
by about 9 percentage points, with an even larger fall in 2008 and 2009. For transitory shocks, 
it is impossible to differentiate the role of savings from international factor income. The second 
hypothesis is that the financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 was 
a shock to the capital market channel. The global financial crisis was a negative systemic shock, 
which has affected the functioning of the capital market channel (consistent with Figure 6 and 
the 2008-09 trough) by reducing international diversification opportunities and drastically 
increasing risk aversion. These factors may have broken the absorption capacity of international 
private transfers and the effect may have been even more visible in the face of lasting shocks.  
Another interesting aspect of the US results is the surprising resilience in the shock-absorption 
capacity of personal savings. This also emerged from Figure 9. Their consumption-smoothing 
capacity usually falls when the length of the shock increases. This fact has theoretical 
foundations (permanent income theory) and is usually supported by evidence. However, it does 
not seem to be the case in this context. How can this be explained? It should be remembered 
that during the financial crisis, the losses, especially those linked to the bursting of the housing 
bubble and the subprime mortgages crisis, have been absorbed through measures that are not 
directly identifiable in the national accounting decomposition as federal intervention, but they 
may well have indirectly resulted in an effect on net savings, safeguarding them. Examples of 
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these are the interventions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) – to protect 
deposits – as well as the action plan to avoid the default of the two federal mortgage 
institutions.29    
The findings about federal transfers, and in particular its growing absorption capacity when 
differencing interval increases, is in line with previous findings for the US. It also is interesting 
to note that when accounting for the breakdown of the net savings to isolate the role of the 
states’ savings, the sum of state channels and the federal transfer’s channels is constant over 
the different time intervals.  
4.1 Comparing the persistence of shocks in the US and the euro area 
To overcome data limitations in the econometric analysis and to get a sense of the differences 
in the persistence of the shocks between the US and the euro area, we calculate the average 
duration of shocks (positive and negative) for each US state and each euro area member state, 
over the period 1990-2013. Similar to the econometric technique used earlier, we defined a 
shock as a deviation from the (weighted) average (GDP growth rate) across the region and 
consider the number of consecutive years above or below such average.  
As will be shown below, the comparison points to a longer duration of shocks in the euro area 
relative to the US, but also larger cross-country differences. Overall, this evidence is consistent 
with the previous finding that in the euro area the capacity of savings to smooth shocks is lower 
than in the US. 
In the case of the US (Figure 10), the average duration goes from just below 2 to about 3.5 
years, and more than 30 of the 52 states have an average duration of around 2 years.     
Figure 10. US: (weighted) average duration of shocks, by state (1965-2013) 
 
Note: We consider the 1965-2013 period, even though it does not correspond to the period considered for the euro area 
because the break in the data in 1997 would require that we cannot take a period 1990-2013.  
Source: Authors’ formulation based on OECD data. 
                                                     
29 In the fall of 2008, the US Treasury placed into conservatorship the government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, and the Federal Reserve started the purchase of their debt, to avoid the default. 
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In the case of the euro area (Figure 11), the average persistence of shocks can vary substantially 
across countries, from less than two years to almost five years.  
It should be noted that this measure of persistence says nothing about the size or the sign of 
the deviation from the average; in other words the persistence could also be associated with 
very small deviations, positive or negative, from the average. Therefore our indicator of the 
persistence of shocks should rather be read as the length of a fictitious business cycle (based 
on the average growth rate of the region rather than the potential output of each country). 
Figure 11. Euro area: shocks’ average duration (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on OECD data.  
Figure 12 complements the information on the persistence with the number of years with 
negative and positive shocks. Some countries have been persistently below or above the 
average. Finland, Portugal and Ireland, on the one hand, and Italy, on the other, are the extreme 
cases. Over the 25 years considered, for 17 years (70% shown in the chart) Italy has been below 
the euro-area average, while for Finland, Portugal and Ireland the opposite is true, 19 years 
above the average. Even though Italy has always been very close to the average euro-area 
growth rate, the result hints at structural differences, at least vis-á-vis Finland and Ireland, 
where the growth rates have been much higher than average. 
Figure 12. Euro area: portion of negative shocks (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on OECD data. 
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From a risk-sharing perspective, differences across countries in the form of negative 
correlations foster diversification and hence are positive. By contrast, too limited changes in 
the sign of the shocks may hint at structural differences associated with systematic under-
performance or over-performance relative to the average. This implies that the shock structure 
might also hinder risk-sharing because of investors’ decisions. A fund manager would probably 
avoid investing in a country that is constantly below the average, even for risk diversification 
purposes. Combined with still-high home-bias, this helps to explain the limited role of capital 
markets in the euro area. 
4.2 International risk-sharing, OCA theory and the shocks in the EA 
As explained in the introduction, the international risk-sharing view of monetary union departs 
from the OCA theory (at least its original formulation) and also from the Maastricht framework, 
which did not explicitly embed the issue of the synchronisation of business cycles or the role of 
financial integration. However, these contributions to the literature are somewhat united in 
the instrumental role that financial integration is expected to play in these theoretical 
predictions. 
The literature investigating whether the introduction of the single currency boosted financial 
integration and contributed to increasing business cycle correlations or international risk-
sharing is difficult to compare and the overall results do not always go in the same direction. 
On the one hand, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010) show that the channels for risk-sharing evolved 
after the creation of EMU. In particular, they find that risk-sharing through factor income flows 
and capital gains was close to zero prior to the introduction of the euro in 1999, but has since 
increased to 6% for each channel. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2008) find that increased holdings of 
foreign assets and banking integration in the EMU have spurred risk-sharing, “improving ex-
post the optimality of the EMU.” By contrast, estimates by Demyank et al. (2007) point to a 
decrease in the overall international credit smoothing in the five years following EMU, 
compared to the five previous years.  
On the other hand, De Grauwe & Yi (2016) find that the synchronisation of the business cycle 
has increased over time since the start of EMU, but so has the difference in the amplitude of 
the cycle across countries. Likewise, Belke et al. (2016) find that, since the late 1990s, in the 
euro area a strong common cycle is associated with large differences in cyclical positions, even 
if national cycles are strongly correlated.  
Overall, it seems from these findings that when looking at the experience of the euro area, the 
financial integration associated with the euro may indeed have increased correlation in 
business cycles, which may have prevented a higher degree of diversification and hence 
international risk-sharing. At the same time, however, it also increased the differences in the 
amplitude of business fluctuations, which may have prevented reaping the benefits of cycle 
synchronisation, as predicted by the OCA theory.  
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Deeper financial integration in the context of the EMU project has always been perceived as a 
good achievement, despite a lack of clear understanding of its specific benefits for the 
monetary union. Financial integration is usually considered a necessary condition for increasing 
completeness of markets, and hence for international risk-sharing, as well for increasing the 
synchronisation of business cycles, as the OCA theory confirms. In reality, it is not a sufficient 
condition for any of them and the stylised facts and empirical evidence shown in this paper, in 
line with other recent empirical literature, seem to suggest that the benefits of a higher degree 
of completeness of markets and increased synchronisation did not materialise. 
The correlations illustrated in section 2 suggest very poor cross-country international risk-
sharing in the euro area, if any at all, even though some improvement occurred after 1998, and 
this is in line with the empirical findings about the very limited capacity of international capital 
markets to absorb the impact of shocks. The evidence of high and heterogeneous persistence 
of the shocks, combined with the evidence of systematic under- and over-performance of 
certain member states, helps explain the limited international risk-sharing. It also suggests that 
while the correlation of cycles may have increased over time, there are structural cross-country 
differences. This feature is not desirable from an OCA theory perspective because it does not 
make monetary policy more effective, nor does it from the point of view of risk-sharing because 
it is likely that this kind of heterogeneity does not allow for good hedging. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The evidence presented in this paper attempts to shed light on the capacity of the euro area to 
smooth the impact of shocks over time and relative to the US, and tries to understand 
differences in the role of the various mechanisms through which the shock absorption happens. 
In doing so, we start by building fully comparable data for the US and the EA and then we 
estimate the different channels using a standard analytical framework, as in Asdrubali et al. 
(1996).  
Our findings confirm that capital markets in the US perform far better than in the euro area in 
supplying risk-sharing. In the euro area, this channel has never been strong, not even after the 
introduction of the euro and during the good years of financial integration. However, under the 
new aggregation, prepared for comparability purposes, the channel performed better than was 
previously found, at least until 2008. After that it collapses and after 2010 it seems to amplify 
shocks rather than absorb them.  
In trying to understand why this is the case, we found that results for the euro area as a whole 
are driven by dynamics in the peripheral euro area countries, where the unsmoothed part of 
the impact of the shock is systematically higher than in the core countries. Moreover, the role 
of the different channels varies considerably over time and across the two groups, while this 
also partially holds for the US due to the large cyclical swings of the last 15 years. In the last 
sub-sample the EA shock-absorption capacity was very small and almost vanishes in peripheral 
countries. 
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We also find that the persistence of shocks is an issue in the euro area relative to the US, for 
two reasons. In the euro area, total savings and borrowing, which include corporate and 
households as well as national budgetary policy (public savings), seem to play a greater role 
than in the US, where instead capital markets provide the largest part of risk-sharing. Since 
shock absorption through saving and borrowing does not usually work in response to 
persistent/permanent shocks, the persistence of the euro area debt crisis may explain why after 
2010 the unsmoothed part of the shock increased dramatically in the euro area and much less 
so in the US.  
In addition to this and in contrast with previous findings, in the US, personal savings have been 
very resilient in smoothing the impact of persistent shocks. It should be noted that net savings 
means both use of savings and borrowing through access to credit markets. We advance the 
hypothesis that such resilience can only be explained by measures taken in response to the 
financial crisis, from the FDIC intervention to the rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac. In the 
euro area, domestic (member state) fiscal policy seems to have been the only tool that 
contributed to smoothing the effect of shocks, but this has been limited in size.  
Further analysis suggests that higher persistence of shocks in the euro area, relative to the US, 
combined with lasting under- and over-performance of certain countries, can explain low 
international risk-sharing. This would also be consistent with the findings that the correlation 
of cycles has increased over time, but remains very different.  
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